During the typologization of the different philosophical orientations, the assertion of the semantic aspect plays always a particular role. Apart from their own concrete definitions, what is important is to achieve their semantic specification as leading objective of the individual philosophies. This exigence means, according to the different dimensions of the various schools and periods always other contents, as an exigence, it does however not change. More strictly considered, the particular epistemological grounds, mainly because of the semantic definition, are essential since they are alone to ensure the real meaning of a category, and thereby the legitimacy of semantics. This is also the reason why later the sciences, or the status of the sciences, enhanced and verified by the proofs, comes to defining the whole semantics, essentially also the current philosophical semantics.
In their semantics, the philosophies are, in the rule, building "from bottom to top", said with unusual words, they need a whole gradually developped range of "pre-semantics”. The epistemology, and then later the status of sciences, verified through proofs, is increasingly determining the consolidation of such pre-semantics.
The more surprising seems, that there are numerous and quite significant philosophies, that consolidate their semantics not "from bottom to top", but rather more "from top to bottom". In a semantic perspective, such a procedure can be characterized as a "indeterminacy semantics", "undetermined" because we already effectively utilize semantics in the implementation of such a structured philosophy, without having beforehand reached its definition.
In clear contrast to the "semantics of the verified status" ("from bottom to top"), the so structured "uncertainty semantics" ("from top to bottom"). does not come back to the pre-semantics, which gradually built up structure leads up to full and valid semantics of the accomplished determinacy. The indeterminacy semantics, i.e. the "semantics from top" is forced to begin its discourse with the introduction of categories that, at this stage of the beginning, cannot yet come back to earlier already confirmed semantics, which in turn is already legitimized through its own verification. Such a beginning of a philosophical discourse makes philosophy at first also under the aspect of understanding defenceless. Its concepts cannot be expecting, that the reader immediately and exactly understands, since also the readers cannot, through the interpretation of these definitions, have recourse to the significances of pre-semantics. For this reason, the interpretation of a philosophy can at first only be arbitrary and accidental. 1
Facing this type of philosophy, we have to assume that this "non-defined" character of the indeterminacy semantics can only be transitional phenomena, because they must be effectively legitimated "in progress", i.e. in the course of the elaboration of the philosophy. These semantics must accept "in this process," certain criteria, that allow then an intersubjective verification, to decide the truth of a whole system of concepts, said in other words, to achieve the "comprehensibility" of a philosophy. 2
It is also to generally state that the indeterminacy semantics needs legitimation at the level of the hermeneutical principles. It often leads to the fact, that thereby often the whole body of such a philosophy becomes the elaboration of this legitimizing process. Within this general context, it is however not indifferent, whether a philosophy built up on the uncertainty semantics (and on the subsequently to be carried out legitimation) emerged before or after that phase, when the verified-legitimate status of the philosophies has become possible through the emergence of these results and insights of the positive Sciences. Under this aspect, the uncertainty semantics applies as much more problem-free in Hegel's case (before the completeness development of the verified-legitimate status of the positive sciences) than somewhat in Husserl's case (after this phase), although this question emanating from the semantics has directly nothing to do with the relation between philosophy and sciences. 3 Even this extremely important aspect cannot characterize exclusively a philosophy. But it has to be noted here, that both Hegel and Husserl make strong efforts for the definition of the indeterminacy, i.e. for the legitimacy of the uncertainty semantics ("work in progress"). Opposite them, the postmodern philosophy can be quite accurately profiled, which will not only not legitimize its also uncertainty semantics in the further elaboration, but it always holds in the foreground possibly like a provocation.
The special role of the philosophical semantics in the typology of philosophical schools appears to us mainly in the heuristic productivity of indeterminacy and determinacy semantics. 4 Historically, belong moreover first of all Hegel, Husserl and the postmodernism, but already with the alluded duality, that consists in the group to the axis legitimization - non-legitimization. It seems to us that the utilization of this semantic approach can highlight numerous problems of the history of philosophy unresolved until now, partly however also the systematic philosophy, and sometimes even can also clear up. 5
Difference (as it is practiced in the postmodernism) means under the aspect of the so-interpreted semantics, that it can be thematic only in a conception, which is firstly coined by the uncertainty semantics and secondly, this uncertainty/indeterminacy in turn does not want to have legitimized. Difference can also be completely inserted in this semantic typology. This also highlights, that the thinking difference is a philosophical strategy and not an instrument of the knowledge of the reality. Here it distinguishes, amongst others, also from Hegel. Under a certain aspect, the thinking difference can be interpreted even as a continuation, but also as a reversal of the original Hegelian problematic of the difference.
As we will see it soon, both just mentioned moments in Husserl make themselves noticeable in relative strangeness. Development ways can be built up, indicating that he only became aware of this problem late. This assures him also in our strict context a very peculiar structural position, a position that seems to oscillate continuously between a "semantics from top" and a "semantics from bottom". According to this reconstruction, he was concerned on long stretches by the „real” show of representational constitution (i.e. the utterance, that this constitution is essentially equal with an interminable process6). May this view still be so right and correct due to its relation to reality, it straight steps aside of the semantic certainty and therefore legitimacy. Here we must fundamentally make the distinction between both here active languages: Husserl's conception envisaged here can only describe the real work of a representational constitution, its object is, therefore, the constitution itself. If we used another language, the one of talking about the objects themselves, it would be clear that we would need a legitimacy of this language, otherwise we would not have agreed upon it.
Already at this point of our thought process, it is clear that this thematization of the philosophical semantics is not identical with an equally legitimate thematization of the semantics in philosophy, and mainly with the problematic of the significance of the language in the philosophical articulation. The relation of these both approaches could be roughly so outlined at this point, that the second kind of semantics should be a kind of "fundamental science" of the philosophy, which is from time to time very strongly mobilized and sensibilized in the dynamics of the paradigmatic development of the philosophy. These are the high times of the philosophy of the language, just when these "fundamental questions" of the language and significance become current, in the largest extent, within the philosophical articulation. 7 Generally said, this (in our range "second") semantics is decisive in certain concrete structural positions.
The other (in our range "first") semantics is quite different to get. The significance of the notion (category), applied here, does not report the one of the fundamental problems. This "semantics" underlines the coherence of a philosophical conception concerning the relevant and objective contents in this philosophy. Finally, it is easy to imagine that the semantics of two different philosophies in regard of their quality on the fundamental problematic language/philosophy is just correct, while they differ significantly from each other in their reference to the concrete contents (and mainly in their definition of the objective contents). This semantics focused on the categorization of the objective contents is then the one, that can be legitimized, that should legitimate itself, also differently and under other points of view, as fundamental problematic acting semantics. It is then decisive, that the so apprehended semantics isn’t no genuine a linguistic-philosophical problem, it does not at all thematize the relation between language and reality, it thematizes the sense, ultimately the legitimate sense of use of notions in an ordered discourse. A semantics can be reconstructed against other possible semantics, it can also be checked for its legitimacy of the use of categories. It goes again without saying, that such a verification has nothing to do with the fundamental problematic of the relation between language (notions) and meaning. Whilst we examine the legitimacy of the category use "protestant ethics", the question is not at all of whether mainly the words, or even the words "protestantism" or "ethics" reflect or not a determined content or a reality, rather more whether the notion "protestant ethics" corresponds or not to a determined, theoretically categorized and, moreover, historical verified content in the context of a complex discussion, already commenced and structured.
While we speak mostly in the philosophical disciplines about semantics of their function as fundamental problematic, it is absolutely frappant, that the semantics understood in our categorical sense can lead a formal triumph in the everyday language of our years. So we have to keep quite silent about the question on "semantics of the programmer's language", "Wolfgang Koeppen's semantics" or "semantics of the space assignment," of other combinations such as "constitutive semantics". One source of this rising career can be designated without difficulty. Apart from the really existing diversity of multicultural ways of speaking and thus of multiple semantics, we must see this one source in the so-called concept of history, that has not finally become nowadays practically a new and independent scientific discipline because of Reiner Koselleck's activities. And in fact, the new use of the category and the categoriality of the "semantics" has really come from the political, ideological and theoretical history, this trend encroaches upon the area of the sociological ideological and theoretical history. The peculiarity in this development was that this use of the notion "semantics" appeared far away from any primary philosophical objective. It finally satisfies an "only" scientifically specialized need of sciences, in which a multiplicity of semantics was per definitionem possible.8 As indicated, this was not the case in all the sciences. If a paradigm prevails, it even means, that a certain semantics has the hegemony, in this case, the question for the semantics of further views and paradigms is as good as obsolete. A completely unexpected other dimension of this interest for the semantics was and is all that the dictatorships of the century let behind them. Their influences in the vocabulary of the diverse social sciences were playing a determinant role straight through the "compromising" effects in the significance formation of the diverse notions. Do we look back only at the duality of both German states, then we can easily affirm how frequently the "semantics" of a term and the same one were, in these states, miles and miles away from each other9. This effect reached also deeply into the field of the philosophically-historically related presentations, whole lifeworks such as Nietzsche's (and in his circle, somewhat Herder's and Fichte's), but also Husserl's (!) have been accused because of the semantics of the dictatorship of the intellectual criminality. No wonder, that it was precisely the social sciences and theoretical field of activity by which this significance of the semantics emerged and widely spread. Straight in their intentionality, they have needed to refer themselves to diverse subjects, to be able to clearly identify the significance of the individual disciplines and within their paradigms.
This enables us to clear emphasize the distinction to the philosophy. In these social sciences, the primary interest, the significance of the individual relevant categories were to be identified in those respective sciences, while in the case of the philosophy, the point in question was to have to legitimize the meaning of the relevant categories (the principles of legitimacy having apparently also to be different, while since Kant, finally in this legitimacy, the question was more or less the scientifically colored object orientation). 10
It is also not at all a peripheral question, why this view of the semantics in the history of thinking has hardly played a larger role. As always in such matters, there are also here numerous and very diverse explanations lines. It seems to us, that the determining and extensive cause for that was the usual conception of the literature of the history of philosophy. The historian of philosophy found an as always specific type of "metalanguage" to describe philosophical concepts different from each other and reflected, in the rarest cases, which semantic problems already occur only in the constitution of his own philosophical metalanguage, let alone, which semantic differences (in terms of categorization) arise within the various philosophical schools and orientations. Thus, all schools were perceived and assessed in their own semantics. Here we meet however also, as well in Husserl (as well as in the definition of semantics "from above", or the same "from bottom") the so important question of the relation between the epistemology and the semantics. In our specific context, it means so much, that the legitimacy of the semantics of the individual philosophies was practically identical with the legitimacy of epistemology. This is obviously correct. But there is a perspectivistic difference. The exclusive fixation of the legitimacy of a philosophy on the verifiability led to the displacement of the sense and interest in the field of the semantics of categories.
We remark this the more stronger, because the categorial semantics can be quite able to perform serious interpretatory, typological and heuristic tasks in the philosophy, or in the history of the philosophy. It also seems to be very likely that it can also open new ways in a possible typology of the philosophy.
A philosophy applies as semantically problem-free, if it is legitimate in its (categorial) semantics, in its relevant form, already containing the respective especially carried out philosophical innovation.
For the time being, this legitimate state can be so defined, that the relevant terms of a philosophy have a corroboration, a verification or otherwise any other legitimation, since the legitimacy of a philosophy will depend on that. In our thought process, we have to take full consideration of the fact that, 1) it is not absolutely necessary that all directions be legitimized on a mutually similar way and 2) the multiplicity of numerous philosophical orientations could push this necessity of the adequate legitimacy apparently in the background. It seems to us that none of these assumptions are conclusive and the legitimacy of the proper categorical semantics remains the most important objective of the shaping of any philosophical constitution.
The introduction of this semantical problematic in the interpretation of philosophy and philosophical schools puts also the question of the "pre-semantics". This question has two sides. One is systematic: every true concept goes back to something, sometimes also to other concepts and facts. More important than this trivial context is given by the fact that certain philosophical approaches go back to earlier and do not deal directly with its grounds (Brentano's intentionality for Husserl could somewhat mean this). This decline on previous semantics is however also important for the reason that only in this comparison, the real innovation of a philosophy can become visible.
In terms of categorical semantics, the innovation can indeed be defined especially in the change of the semantics, a modification is however most of the time not quite absolute. The significance of an innovation of an approach can only be proved right on the base of the previous semantics.
No philosophy is an obstacle to the world in its universal reflection as the first and also not as the only philosophy. No reader of philosophical works is reading a philosophical work as if it was the first and only philosophical work. These fundamental facts underline the significance of the respective current "pre-semantics", according and on which will be built the new categorical semantics. The respective current pre-semantics also serves in this way the comprehension, since the semantics of the current new work should be legitimated facing its horizon not in all its details holistically. In addition, the assumed relevance of the respective current pre-semantics also in the legitimacy problematic is by no means to be neglected. It has just a theoretical and practical significance, that elements of a pre-semantics must no longer be legitimized in detail in a new categoriality (again Husserl's example with Brentano's intentionality).
The most important context for us presently is that the own interest and need of a philosophy is to legitimize its semantics and in this way to position it in the space of "true" and "wrong". It could also be that a philosophy achieves the assessment of its own truth content not through own grounds, but entrust its assessment to the reader. It is however not so. Modern philosophies in their historical and structural position persist however on these grounds. Would it be however so, then the question arises how the different semantics of the miscellaneous philosophies are built and whether on this basis a semantic new start as such would even be possible. Thus, the thesis proves itself from the so understood semantics in the interpretation of different philosophical concepts. It is however very important to clarify that this should not be regarded as a question of a semantic philosophy, but also none of a philosophical semantics as fundamental problematic "language-thinking". What is here about, is the „categorial” semantics of a philosophy differently constructed at any time.
If we try to understand, how individual philosophies proceed, when they want to prevail, so we must confront us with the problematic of the legitimacy of the peculiar semantics. We need to refrain from individual concrete orientations and schools, since in the structure and building of their semantics ready for legitimacy, the different, otherwise conflicting directions can absolutely coincide. It is to be expected that the most philosophies build their categorical semantics "from bottom", attribute their categories at least partly to categories, that are already verified. This approach is important for the comprehension, that we refrain from the diverse characteristics of the diverse philosophical schools, since we want in the following to speak in general about philosophies with "from bottom" constructed semantics, without any consideration for the fact, that rather empiricist or positivist directions will be obviously expected, which in a transparent way will dispose of such a semantics.
In this context, we might easily think, that every philosophy consolidates a "semantics from bottom", and mainly on the basis of the thereby resulting transparent legitimacy of its own semantics. There are however even in the very new philosophy three quite valuable and relevant philosophical families, which despite this appearance do not proceed so. Instead of a "semantics from bottom", they build a "semantics from top". Immediately, it means that they introduce a terminology, which semantics at the beginning of the philosophical representation even by definition can not be legitimized. We therefore use notions, which full meaning can be quite determined or defined, only in and after the development of the whole philosophical material. As it has been the case with the other group, it is also quite decisive with the philosophies of the "semantics from top", that we refrain by application of this aspect of the individual concrete directions and schools, since this quality can, in various schools also establish a structural isomorphism, as it was the case with the other group. Already now, we suggest (and it will straight win a multiple significance for Husserl) that the semantics commenced "from top" be in a concrete philosophy always an indeterminacy semantics.11 It goes however without saying, that philosophies with "semantics from top" or "indeterminacy semantics" are in principle not established against the legitimacy of the own semantics.
This constitutes the main part of their activities, that they want to catch up in progress the grounds of the own semantics. It is quite not rare that finally all the efforts of a philosophy "from top" orientate such as producing a thought process, which retrospectively makes the already used terminology and semantics comprehensible and legitimizes them. The question is obviously again legitimate: why philosophies arise with "semantics from top", if they want also to legitimize their semantics. The answer to this question is as frappant as banal: these philosophies arise in determined ages when a philosophy - regardless of the specific historical reasons 12- must decide to establish also a semantics, which will be quite legitimized only in the elaboration of the concerned philosophy. It seems to be clear that the philosophies with "semantics from top" always mark a new philosophical commencement, it is more or less the situation, in which they have to go with a non secured semantics in the battle of the philosophy.
Despite the multiple differences to be otherwise discovered, we can include in this group three great philosophical families.13 It is about Hegel (as well with Fichte, as also completed with a large proportion of Neohegelians), the phenomenology and postmodernism (which has grown from a philosophical post-structuralism).
Without voluntarily forcing the discovery of a common element in these philosophical families distinguishing clearly from each other, common dimensions, if not even common interfaces can be confirmed amongst them. All three major philosophies agree upon that they all orientate against the modern form of positivism. In our concrete context, it also means, however, that they are also directed against the "semantics from bottom" of any possible positivist philosophy. Whether true or not, we leave it pending, the fact is nevertheless that they comply with this decision of a broad social insight and attitude, namely those that never could put up with the philosophical hegemony of the positivism (otherwise occuring in many different forms). Without having used the further details here, the general context seems to consist in the fact that the application of the aspect of the (categorical) semantics has already revealed in the typology of the history of philosophy as successful.
Such a new philosophical beginning, the philosophy of the "semantics from top" (or again expressed differently: of the "uncertainty semantics") means for the reader that on reading he can fall back upon no already-known "pre-semantics". In a certain sense, he can - because of the fundamental communicative situation - not understand the text, what can however not be quite absolute, on the other hand, of course for many other reasons. We have repeatedly pointed out that the starting situation can be resolved only through a conscious design of the concerned philosophical discourse, and mainly defined through a conceptual representation of the significance, or the reference of the diverse categories. This means a construction "from top", which cannot indeed again be confused with the historically well known forms of non further defined deductive approaches. And in any case this construction must be a constant work in progress, for which again Husserl could make one of the most striking examples.
Under our aspect, an amazing perspective is emerging. It becomes apparent, that philosophies represent always, with the "semantics from top" a state of exception in the history of the philosophy, since the risk of an uncertainty semantics would be hardly perceived without exception conditions. And in fact, in Hegel (and mainly even with Fichte), this situation of the post-Kantian state results, in Husserl, in an inner urge to found, in a new way, a philosophical knowledge in the context of the positivism, while in the postmodernism, the same attitude is initiated through a conscious, philosophical strategie to be interpreted in detail quite differently.
How such a "semantics from top" arises, how it is consolidated step by step and how the content of such a philosophy, in no little extent, is constituted just by the efforts to legitimize the starting semantics, shows demonstratively Hegel's famous example. At the moment, when he enunciates for the first time, that the "substance" is "subject", this sentence is still working with no determined semantics and it may also not yet be understandable to the reader. The references of these two notions are not only strange and abrupt, they are even conflicting opposed to each other. The task of the positive comments of this philosophy is to create a conceptual space, in which "subject" and "substance" can become elements of a common semantics. Thus, the positive philosophical reflection works in the most explicite way to legitimize its semantics. It will create a world, in which the semantics of the sentence "subject is substance" becomes legitimate.
In the philosophical new commencement, an ideal-typical genuine character of every philosophy manifests itself, also showing itself evident in Husserl, namely the perfect access to recently understand and describe the world. It is well known that this picture of the philosophy still goes on living intact in our days. And how many, still today, consider as a privilege of the philosophy, to describe the world just as they like it. Furthermore, it is also true that a philosophical new commencement, straight due to the fact of using the possibility, at least temporarily indeterminate uncertainty semantics, can create new synergetic links, open the way to new philosophical relationships and new philosophical complexities, as well with new synergetics, in the true sense of the word, develop again the world. Will stay out of these new achievements, however only those who can secure the concerned philosophy through the legitimacy of its semantics. From this perspective, it can be studied as an example of how little formally and conceptually the need to legitimize the semantics is created. It is namely not about securing the terminology of a philosophy, but about securing a new whole world vision, that could not differently be identified, than even only through a "semantics from top".
In an attempt to operate the concrete way of a further concretization of the "semantics from top", these three very relevant philosophical families can be clearly distinguished from each other. Hegel consolidates, through the instruments of the identity and the difference, a huge range of definitions, he shows the diverse notions of so many different perspectives, that the categories are legitimized in an ever greater extent, even more, on the line of the concept use, appears to us effectively quite a lot a new world, that in the terminology of the philosopher finds effectively its legitimate description. In this respect, the postmodernism applies as a straight opposite pole to Hegel and this relation could be identified only through the full utilization of the semantic aspect. While namely Hegel's whole effort consisted in the fact of legitimizing the initially non defined uncertainty semantics (to create a specific identity from the difference), it reveals as the most important definition of the postmodernism, as a strategy to leave the non defined semantics in its indeterminacy/uncertainty (to let the difference remain difference).
Besides, Husserl has a peculiar position in the context of a group of the so-defined semantics "from top". Already the first impression of the philosophical reader attests, that he always fights for a transcendentality, which is deeper and truthfuler than many of its rivals (often not always designated by name). He does all this but not according to the model of the other main directions, what also means so much, that he changes the rules of the determination of the semantics.
In the following, we think under no circumstances to realize or reconstruct Husserl's phenomenology in its whole. Our objective is to show which problems the phenomenological philosophy prepares, if we could categorize them in this outlined typology of the philosophical semantics. It is important to point out that it is not Husserl's philosophy that has led us to the idea of this typology of the semantic construction, but, in reverse order, the idea of the heuristic value of this typology that led us, this time, to Husserl (and to Hegel and to the postmodernism).
Husserl's constant experimentation brings results, which make absolutely difficult a typological categorization. He goes on the line of the greater exigence to truth, while he seems to neglect in places, besides, the necessity of the legitimation of the semantics. It seems to us, it cannot be, only under the aspect thematized in this work, a peculiar, if not just singular facet of Husserl's phenomenological approach. We consider this characteristic as singular essentially because in most similar approaches of the tradition, both moments straight combine in the reverse direction. The exigence to higher truth ability is with the will to legitimize the own semantics in most cases strictly related, but also the will to legitimize the own semantics is understood and represented as an exigence of higher truth ability.
The possibility of Husserl's confrontation with the problematic of the legitimacy of the own semantics is in Janssen's following thoughts (although the immediate context of this thought process is not dictated directly by the legitimacy problematic). Janssen formulates in his description (which can be also perceived as a disguised criticism), that the significances (of the notions used in Husserl's transcendental approaches) are not present in the education language. It is a perfectly appropriate assumption, because the linguistic comparability of concepts give an irreplaceable part of the legitimacy of the own semantics. Janssen's second important remark for our argumentation says, that (Husserl's) decisions (in the consolidation of the transcendentality of the phenomenological recognition) are relative to philosophical thought processes, which can not be in agreement with the contents. Our interpretation is finally that they reveal, for that reason, no objective or otherwise any general criteria.
Janssen is building a way of understanding for this Husserlian attitude, in that the latter describes excellently the perception and the subject-relation, while he cannot "see", i.e. reflect the perception of his own subject-relation.
This indication is all the more valuable, because in it the so important intentionality is evoked. It goes without saying, however, that here the lack of knowledge about the subject-relation in the legitimacy of the own semantics is a necessary condition.
The problem of the legitimacy of the own semantics appears in Husserl's phenomenology largely as a relation between the transcendental objective phenomenon and the "real" subject, as it has been visible also among the lines in the above-aimed approach. No wonder that we can find, in defining the noema, some inconsistencies, whether it is also an extension of the semantic definition of the word meaning. We must again point out, that this problematic, for us, at this point, not because of its philosophical content, but because of the legitimacy of the own semantics, or because of the possible categorization, is in one of both types of importance. While the noematic core can be simultaneously subject of a true and of a false assessment, it withdraws its use of the semantic legitimacy of a philosophy.
In Husserl's own use of the language, it is usually the subjectivity that marks for us the context of the legitimacy problems. If we follow Husserl's efforts in the interest of surpassing the subjectivity, so we can imagine, that his interest has by no means missed this problematic (also in the form of a solipsistic danger).
The categorization of Husserl's phenomenology in a typology "semantics from top" and "semantics from bottom" depends initially on which moment we want to emphasize and then outline their constitution of subject.
If we follow Husserl's intention to comprehend the subject constitution "truthful", so it would be quite possible to classify it in the group "semantics from bottom". If we follow his solution, to entrust relevant moments of the transcendentality of the individual consciousness acts, it would be also possible to classify this philosophy in the group "semantics from top". Above all, it can be put more in this second group, because its expanded truth exigence, in historical extent, is, deliberately or not, directed against philosophies of the group "semantics from bottom". Besides, all the related problems are however not at all solved, since Husserl's coexistence between increased truth exigence and missing sense for the necessity of legitimizing the own semantics will still reveal many open questions.
Notes
1 Quite literally taken, both aspects of this fact can also be further separated from each other. The notions are not yet "legitimate" in the sense indicated at first above, while for the same reasons they also at the beginning can not be perfectly understood.
2 Obviously, we mean under "comprehensibility" of a philosophy not an ability for the everyday language or the everyday consciousness. Here, it is about the basic semantic conditions of the philosophical comprehension.
3 Max Horkheimer describes very frappant the "indeterminate" semantics, in our language, when he writes about the "refusal of the old theories of abstraction" in Husserl. He explains this refusal (which, according to our notions, means the dominance of the indeterminacy semantics), that the "general" is, on the basis of this view, just as "original" as the "particular" and - as Horkheimer about Husserl - the transforming semantics of the indeterminacy requires, in the semantics of the universality, no further legitimation. Ld Max Horkheimer, Collected writings. Volume 10: Posthumous writings 1914-1931. Frankfurt/Main, 1990. 391-392.
4 The confrontation of these both types would become our opinion on the most productive area of the philosophical application of semantics, although the "artificial" semantics inaugurated by Carnap apparently corresponded better to these philosophical needs. See, for example, Wolfgang Stegmüller, Metaphysics, Science, Skepticism. Frankfurt/Main - Vienna, 1954. 39-40.
5 Feyerabend, typically without the use of the term "semantics", speaks at a point about the fact that we must learn to use notions for which the rules of use are not yet available. S. Paul Feyerabend, Against the Method constraint. Frankfurt/Main, 1976. 336. - It is clear that here the indeterminacy semantics is described, while Feyerabend holds the progressive legitimacy of the semantics as evident.
6The indication applies to the global train of character of Husserl's transcendental constitution of the philosophical subject..
7 About the idea : in the philosophy of the language, it is known since Herder and Humboldt up to the modern linguistic field theory and neopositivism, that the language influences the thinking.
8 It is a far leading scientific-theoretical fact, that it can not refer to all the sciences.
9 The linguistics straight set on the differences meant at a time "linguistic pragmatics", although only the reasons of divergent phenomena, in the strict sense pragmatically, and the phenomena were themselves determined semantically.
10 Besides, the distinction in thing in itself and phenomenon, the criticism of the ontological proof of God existence, as well as the outlining of the field of the possible experience played a role widely spread beyond Kant.
11 Meaningful analogies with the indeterminacy problematic of modern physics are quite opportune.
12 There are in all three major philosophical families also different, mainly historical reasons, however also - as it will also be discussed - some common orientations.
13 These three families distinguish also in that train (not touched in this work), which dimensions they can accept in them also from a "semantics from bottom".