(Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Recognition)
While Rousseau, through the radical optic of an equality never articulated in this form, examines with a fine-tooth comb the institution of the society, he however opens also simultaneously to another front as well. With the radical criticism of the society, he puts at the same time, and just as radically, the question of the human nature. Rousseau sings the praises of the nature, at the same time he puts fundamentally into question the human nature in the society, if we want in another way, the social nature of man.
It is certain, that the problematic of the recognition (reconnaissance) and the Mainstream of the ideologically simplified Enlightenment are clearly in conflict with each other. This conflict played also in the notorious controversy between Rousseau and Voltaire a decisive role. Nevertheless, we do not focus here this contradiction, although every ideologically simplified Enlightenment avoids demonstratively every thematization of the problem of recognition.
We are reconstructing here a Rousseau, who was a philosopher of the recognition.1 This means, that the problematic of the recognition is standing, in a global way, behind every Rousseau’s really relevant philosophical approach. It is however also certain, that Rousseau’s philosophy is not fully exhausted in the problematic of recognition. This problematic is generally determining, it however also allows, like spontaneously, in every philosophical domain of themes, to build up on it, as a basis, from the Contrat Social up to Emil, still numerous concrete-positive concepts. This proves now from this perspective, that the problematic of the recognition is in itself, in the stricter sense, no “theory”, what also means, that the problematic of the recognition does not just defines a whole philosophical concept, for it would be precisely, in this case, a theory! That this double status could be possible with a relatively loose connection between the problematic of the recognition and the individual thematic approaches, is also a consequence of the concrete state of the systematic character of the philosophy in the eighteenth century.2 The problematic of the recognition does not then apply for a theory or for any related concept, also for no ideology, it is (simply only) an approach, that shows a strong explanatory potential from the philosophy of the history up to the social ontology.
Rousseau’s own version of the recognition is one of the many possibilities. Since no “standard” and/or no ideal type of the philosophical conception of the problematic of the recognition is existing, the task is not at all easy to situate exactly Rousseau’s own version. Somewhat in comparison with Helgel’s vision of the problematic of the recognition, that is tacitly comprehended as the ideal type, because of its historical real importance,3 Rousseau’s vision appears as personally particular, but also as psychological and “literary”. Rousseau’s solution to this problem consists mainly in a reversal of it. An idea that, in a certain context suppresses the dilemma, appears as a solution. This “dialectics” is however, on its part, also not far from Hegel.
Ferner ergibt sich eine weitere Reihe von produktiven Vergleichsmöglichkeiten, so unter anderen die Möglichkeit, Rousseau’s umfassende und universale Sensibilitaet für Anerkennung (und damit für Freiheit und Gleichheit) mit dem Libertinismus des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts und de Marquis de Sade, denn
es ist kein Spiel mit den Worten, wenn man diesen Libertinismus als auch eine Art „Kampf um die Anerkennung“ interpretiert (waehrend Rousseau’s Grundattitüde in diesem weiteren Kontext der Anerkennungsproblematik mit Notwendigkeit als anti-libertinaer definiert werden muss.“4
Weil es trotz Hegel keinen idealen Typus der philosophischen Anerkennungsproblematik gibt, steht Rousseaus’s Konzept unter keinem sichtbaren oder unsichtbaren Zwang von Vergleichen steht. Man kann doch ohne Schwierigkeiten verstehen, warum diese Problematik von Zeit zu Zeit in der Geschichte der Philosophie (der Geschichtsphilosophie, der Sozialphilosophie, der Aesthetik, der politischen Philosophie, etc.) nicht nur wiederkehrt, sondern auch unschwer in eine dominante und zentrale Konzeption kommt. Es liegt daran, dass der Anerkennungs-Entwurf ein besonders reiches heuristisches Vertikum aufweist. Der Ansatz erscheint auf allen Ebenen der untersuchten Wirklichkeit, er reproduziert sich in jedem philosophischen Sektor, sein Vertikum bleibt darüber hinaus auch stets ein zusammenhaengendes und gleichzeitiges. Es geht um seinen Komplexum-Charakter, der stets die Analysen der verschiedenen Seinsschichten und der verschiedenen philosophischen Gebiete als eine lebendige Einheit vorweist. Denn (und dafür ist gerade Rousseau das beste Beispiel) der Kampf um die Anerkennung erscheint schon in der Innenwelt der Psyche, zieht durch das ganze Medium des Sozialen hindurch, praegt das Wirtschaftliche auch tief, über die Politik oder die intellektuelle Dimension ganz zu schweigen. Es bedeutet kein unorganisches Neben- oder Übereinander. Der konkrete Ansatz der Anerkennung verbindet Komplexe, die gleichzeitig auf allen diesen Seinsschichten gleichzeitig aktiv sind und auf diese Weise eine Quasi-Gegenstaendlichkeit repraesentieren. Rousseau’s Auffassung der Anerkennung ist darüber hinaus universal, folglich zerstreut, nicht auf ein Gegeneinander fokusiert. Daher fehlen bei ihm oft die Momente der Gegenseitigkeit im Kampf um die Anerkennung, die ja die weitere Differenzierung und Bereicherung dieses Verhaeltnisses des öfteren wirklich ermöglichen.
Furthermore, there is another range of productive opportunities of comparison, so amongst others Rousseau’s global and universal sensibility for the recognition (and thus for freedom and equality) with the libertarianism of the eighteenth century and of the Marquis de Sade, for it is no game with the words, if we interpret this libertarianism also as a kind of “struggle for the recognition” (while Rousseau’s fundamental attitude in this ample context of the problematic of the recognition must be necessarily defined as anti-libertarian)” 5.
Because there is, despite Hegel, no ideal type of the philosophical problematic of the recognition, Rousseau’s concept is under no visible or unvisible constraint of comparison. We can however easily understand, why this problematic, from time to time, does not only comes back in the history of the philosophy (of the philosophy of the history, of the social philosophy, of the aesthetics, of the political philosophy, etc.), but also easily comes in a dominant and central conception. It is the reason why the project of recognition shows a particularly rich heuristic verticum. The approach appears on all levels of the investigated reality. It reproduces in every philosophical sector, its verticum remains also always a coherent and simultaneous one. It is about its complex-character, that has always the analyses of the diverse strata of existence and the diverse philosophical domains as a living unit. For (and here Rousseau is precisely the best example) the struggle for the recognition appears already in the inner world of the psyche, runs through the whole milieu of the social, marks also deeply the economical, without speaking of the politics or the intellectual dimension. This means no unorganic juxtaposition or superposition. The concrete approach of the recognition associates complexes, which are simultaneously active on all these strata of existence and, in this way, represent a quasi-objectivity. Rousseau’s vision of the recognition is universal, consequently also dispersed, whilst it does not focus a mutual conflict in the struggle of the recognition. Therefore, in the struggle for the recognition are often missing in him the moments of the reciprocity, that enable most often really the further differentiation and enrichment of this relation.
It follows, that precisely as approach, the problematic of the recognition is no concrete theory, no independent system of thought, no philosophy for the description of the reality, it is an approach, starting from which a philosophical vision becomes (not taken in Husserl’s sense) possibly an essence. However, this essence does not lose therefore its ability of integration, because its verticum (integrating the diverse objective spheres) is and remains connected to the reality with hundred threads.
The prized memoir about the possible progress through the science (Discours sur les Sciences et les Arts – Treatise on the Sciences and Arts, 1750) made rightly Rousseau famous. Not even in retrospect, the main thrust of the work loses its power : the paradoxical and diametrical questioning of maybe the deepest evidence of the eighteenth century (of the progress) applies equally as Rousseau’s earliest example of specific essence. This paradoxical questioning of the very most dominant opinion could not have meant even alone any sufficient background of a charismatic philosopher of the future. For the other side of the argument was not less surprising and paradoxical. It is not the apparently focussed civilisational potential that was directly put into question ! What played the most important role in founding the negative thesis, was the destructive dimension of the civilization itself ! Already the first signs of the emergence of the civilization are destructing the world of life of the nature, they cover the “iron chain” of the humanity with a “flower crown” ! It is in no sense about any analogy of a colonization of any stamp ! It is therefore not about the fact, that the “civilization” would willfully exercise an influence on a given community in the nature state and have negative incidences then later on the community of the nature state. The apparition of the civilization is then already “in itself” destructive, “without any conscious willfull intentions”. This community lives in a “wild” nature state and, according to Rousseau, the civilization is precisely destroying the nature state, and indeed without any ill-will ! At this point, a clear contradiction would arise – either the concept of the “nature state” or the concept of the “civilization” should come into play. Here only, we can perceive the true importance of the problematic of the recognition. For it is not really the civilization, which has a direct destructive impact, but it creates a space, in which man, the human nature, in sign of the will of recognition deeply anchored in them, will have on the own community a destructive influence6. The Confessions (Les Confessions, 1782) allow us another insight in Rousseau’s peculiarity in the problematic of recognition. This work applies as unique under more than one aspect not only in the world literature, but also in the history of the human thinking and/or in the history of the social nature of man. It is not a coincidence, that even the basic idea and the initiative of the whole work are to be interpreted as an overall reaction to Voltaire’s provocative attacks.
We rightly experienced the Confessions as a work of the endless sincerity, of the self-unmasking, distinguishing from the other possibilities of the poetic immediacy in the fact, that here the sincerity is the object of the whole work. The work allows Rousseau to realize fully his own kind of vision of the problematic of the recognition. Rousseau’s fundamental attitude articulates the genre of the Confessions, with its free objectivity, with the legitimate arbitrariness of the currents of thinking and with the detached biographical order : The human nature is fatefully filled by the desire of recognition – there is only one salvation, to get out more or less of the society, and to find the peace of the soul in the real and symbolic nature. In the Confessions, every level, every problem field of the struggle of the individuals against each other is quoted, here the hypocritical inner laws of the social and intellectual life, the envy, the jealousy, the intrigues, the emotions, the resentment, the alienation, the infidelity are put in exergue, from the insight, in which Rousseau is like criticized by himself (he did not go to Holbach, because this one is “so rich”), up to the intrigues having become the inner nature (e.g. : “you are attacking my work, but through my work, you wanted to attack me personally). The human nature corrupted by the society becomes, in his mind, stronger than the force of the nature. In a letter to Voltaire (on August 8th, 1756), “such” people are responsible for of this disaster (for the earthquake in Lisbon !), because they did not flee immediately from their homes, the number of victims having been thus significantly increased7.
We have again in front of us a legitimate objective sphere in an oeuvre of Rousseau and this sphere is that of the confessions of a modern intellectual. If we however have a look behind this concrete object area, we again see the fateful reign of a struggle for recognition, that we by far not only perceive in the others, but also most often in ourselves.
The work on the “Origin of the Inequality” (Treatise on the Origin and foundations of the inequality amongst people, 1755) had a consistent and coherent reception history. Not only the long decades of the left and/or Marxist chapter of the reception history had an effect in the sense, that the most thematized emergence of the private property has become an obvious equivalence of the human inequality, this view was already also prevalent in the immediate reception. Do we have again a look behind this assumption, with all its conceptual expressions of the needs, interests and tendencies, we will again recognize, that the context quoted at the beginning consists in reversed order also in the following : It is non only the private property that leads to the inequality amongst the people, but it is also the inequality amongst the people (its constant willingness to the struggle for the recognition, which is already in itself a struggle for the inequality) for the emergence of the private property.
It is similar also with the basic problematic of the Social Contract (The Social Contract or the principles of the Political Right, 1762). If a work of Rousseau has had a permanent reception in the following centuries, it was this work. But the elements of the problematic of the recognition are appearing even behind the objective sphere of this work. It is in every case, determined through and through by the fact of leaving the state of nature, which is no primitive state, but also by the struggle for the recognition. The moment of the equality, according to the volonté générale, contained in every case, gets its legitimacy from the “freedom of the majority”, which in turn gets its rank amongst others also from this same freedom, so that it becomes able on the basis of this first step of legitimacy, to put an end to the permanent struggle for the recognition considered as natural.8 In this sense, the volonté générale appears as a certain “dialectic of the recognition”, a volition grows out of the pain of the struggle for the recognition, that can rule over everyone....
The also classical confession about the education, the Emile (Emile or about the Education, 1762) shows also this problematic. Behind the encyclopaedic wealth of the substance, these moments become also visible here, about which we could already speak in the context of the previous works. The Emile is an inexhaustible inventory of how Rousseau sees the nature of man. The Savoyard Vicar formulates also an orderly focus of this image of man. Behind this image of man, we discover also the contours of a natural being, which is fatidically yielded to the struggle for the recognition. Sometimes, a possibility of modifying the nature of man appears also in the education. Even if the discourse on the education is not finally carried out on this very most fundamental level, the portrait of the Savoyard Vicar delivers us already a coherent and successful image of the life, of how we could combat for the freedom of a life without any recognition. The classical “novel of education” contains endless facets of thoughts and investigations, that are related to the education. This quantity of references cannot at all make forget, that there is also here a strikingly significant number of thoughts and investigations, that compare the “real” nature of man with the “social” realities of the same nature of man, so that up to the end of the work, the dimension of the recognition is perceptible for someone reading philosophically. A philosophical generalization out of the many possible examples : “The one, who wants to get in the bourgeois order the preference of the sensations of the nature, does not know, what he wants. Constantly in contradiction with oneself ; constantly doubting between one’s inclinations and duties, he will never be either man or bourgeois. He will be a man of our epoch, a French man, Englisch man, a city inhabitant, he will be nothing”. 9
The force of the will, to free man (from the dependence of the struggle for the recognition), contains already in those questionings, that are in themselves not politically colored, an extremely strong potential of liberation. This is precisely the immanent revolution in Rousseau. This peculiarity emerges as a manifestation of the whole range of questionings (mainly of the problematic of the recognition), in which Rousseau becomes then suddenly revolutionary through the radical questioning of the principles, as he was not intending to deliberately. This is a case of the structural revolution in concrete contexts of problems. Another problem of Rousseau par excellence arises precisely at this point. Through the completed structural revolution of this type, its protagonist gets – also unintentionally – into the situation of somebody that, through the questioning of the existent, represents in a concrete factual context, through this structural revolution, a positive promise, which becomes visible, like automatically, as the positive side of the problematic just in object.
In the stricter sense, it would also not be right to speak about a promise, for Rousseau does not promise anything here, he makes clear a degree of freedom hitherto not imagined. He talks (without any promise and without any explicit political behaviour) of an unprecedented freedom, that we might call in certain contexts also “absolute” freedom (with equality). This has however again far-reaching consequences for, intentionally or not (probably at the beginning unintentionally and then always more strongly already intentionally), Rousseau sets standards : in every questioning, where the freedom can really play a role, it is now not possible, to start from another point than just the point of an “absolute” and “undivided” freedom.10 This potential of freedom leads, as said, to the fact, that it could also happen always without Rousseau’s intentions, to a general questioning of the existing society. And this attitude of a structural revolutionarity confirms most unexpectedly Nietzsche’s judgment about Rousseau. 11
Friedrich Nietzsche’s positive ideal of personality, that is indeed reformulated from time to time, shows already decisive constant trains. Napoleon’s figure gehört somewhat to the complex of the French Revolution. His criticism of an ideology-critically reconstructed attitude, the common trains of which he sees as well in the Christianity as also in Rousseau and the socialism, put other questions. Nietzsche sees in this attitude a theoretical like practical enemy of his ideal of man. Nietzsche’s fighting attitude against the ideology-critical complex Christianity-Rousseau-socialism was though already earlier intellectually ready, it was then clearly going ahead of its application to the French Revolution. We arrive to the openly paradoxical conclusion, that the French Revolution was not really interesting Nietzsche for its own sake, but as a step in the historical evolution of an attitude, that he was considering – as logical consequence of his whole philosophy – as his enemy. This greatest event of his century was revealing, for the thinker of the next decade merely as an epiphenomenon : „Continuation of the Christianity through the French Revolution. The seducer is Rousseau…“12
It seems to us, that we can find the explanation to this surprising trilogy (Christianity-Rousseau-socialism) on the basis of what has been elaborated in our attempt. All three (Christianity, Rousseau, socialism) are deligitimizing, through their new potential of freedom, the entire existing reality (society) of their epoch. Through such a radical deligitimization, they reach – nolens-volens – a position, that they promise to be a new, better alternative. Nietzsche thinks, that this promise is unfounded. From now on, these movements appear, in Nietzsche’s mind, so that he can address them with a certain suspicion of unfounded promise. 13
The specific difficulties in the interpretation of the problematic of the recognition are appearing mainly in the deciphering of its semantics.14 Rousseau wanted to unite two huge philosophical intentions, that could not be quite harmoniously associated in the whole later development of the philosophy. Formulated in the reverse order, we can also say, that he could not „choose“ between both these huge directions.
Do we enquire about the concrete natures of both these comprehensive approaches, we are inclined, to understand Rousseau and to be able to choose between a positive description of the philosophical objectivity and a practical philosophy. Moments of these „two souls“ of Rousseau were and are recognized and identified, from time to time, in the philosophical tradition. After all, in him it was about a thinker of the eighteenth century and of the Enlightenment, when the emergence of the new systematic philosophy was still starting, so we accepted this duality in Rousseau at least more easily than it has been the case with later representatives of this attitude. So, we accept up today in Rousseau, that he was not ready to separate the ideal from the real, the self-consciousness form the being or the consciousness from the substance.
This union of the irreconcilable (positively philosophical description of the reality + a philosophy for the practical modification of the reality) appeared then in the eighteenth century as still more natural than it has been the case somewhat in the nineteenth, let alone in the twentieth century. Nevertheless, it must be said clearly, that this alternative of the philosophy was thus essentially possible, the problematic of the recognition being contained also in the profoundness of Rousseau’s philosophy. For, the recognition offers a mode of thinking, that enables in most cases, that the positive description of an „actual“-state be homogenously reconcilable with the elaboration of a „supposed to be“-state.
This means, that the recognition can proceed to penetrate in the very deepest level of the philosophical theory building, it is able to unite in a medium the real and the supposed to be.
There were however in the so complete verticum of the problematic of the recognition also other motives. How could a Rousseau become any engaged researcher of this problematic, if Frederick IInd could address to Voltaire the following „recognition“ : „Do enjoy for a long time the fame in this world, where you are triumphing over rivalry and envy ; Do overflow us, in your evening twilight, with those rays of taste and genius, that you are the single person to be able to transmit out of Louis XIVth’s century, to which you are so much belonging ; do pour those rays over the literature, preventing it thus to degenerate…“15
Note
1 See also : Axel Honneth : Struggle for the recognition. Toward the moral grammar of the social conflicts. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1992. and Neuhouser, Frederic, Pathologies of the self-love: Freedom and recognition in Rousseau. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag 2012 Lagerort: T-34
2 Differently said : This situation signals the present state of the systematic philosophy as a system !
3 This insight is perfectly legitimate, because of the huge heuristic dimension of the Hegelian vision, but also because of the historical importance, up today not exactly evaluated. However, this can also not mean, when such facts exist, that therefore the Hegelian vision of the problematic of the recognition might be comprehended as the basic model of this problematic in the status of a theory. Hegel’s positive inhibition toward Diderot’s Jacques et son maître points an interesting way in the eighteenth century. Characteristically, this work is existing in German under the title : Jacques, der Phatalist ! It shows, that the problematic of the recognition is also banished from the title. A short quotation from an Hegelian approach, applying as unknown : „…we see Diderot’s Jacques et son maitre, the master does nothing else than taking prizes tobacco and looking at the clock, and can ensure the servants all the rest.” See „Who does abstractly think ? in : Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Miscelleaneous writings from the Berlin period. With Hermann Glockner’s foreword. Stuttgart, 1930. (Fr. Frommanns Verlag, H Kurtz). P. 450.
4 Da der auktoriale de Sade der Fiktion gemaess nicht identisch mit seinen bewusst libertinistischen Protagonisten (und Protagonistinnen) ist, ist es nicht leicht, dieses Moment bei den Romanen selbst nachzuweisen. Statt dessen führen wir ein kurzes Zitat aus der Gedachtnisrede de Sades von Marat an: „Man sagt, die Selbstsucht sei die Grundlage aller menschlichen Handlungen…Oh, Marat Deine erhabenen Taten entziehen Dich völlig diesem allgemeinen Gesetz!” S. Donatien Alphonse Francois Marquis de Sade, Ausgewaehlte Werke 2. Herausgegeben von Marion Luckow. Hamburg, 1962. (Fischer),329.
5 Since the authorial de Sade, according to the fiction, is not identical to his deliberately libertinistic protagonists (men and women ), it is not easy to detect this moment in the novels themselves. Instead of that, we make a brief quotation from de Sade's memorial speech on Marat , "We say that the egoism is the basis of all human actions ... Oh, Marat your illustrious acts make you completely escape this universal law !"S. Donatien Alphonse Francois Marquis de Sade, Selected Works 2nd publication by Marion Luckow. Hamburg, 1962. (Fischer),329.
6 This means that the problematic of the recognition with Rousseau is continuously the real background for so comprehensive concepts such as "Nature", "civilization" or "man".
7 Voltaire, Correspondence beteen the years 1749 and 1760. Published by Rudolf Noack , à partir du français de Bernhard Henschel, Leipzig o.J., (Philipp Reclam junior). P. 100.
8 In an interesting manner, Moses Hess associates, also as a very competent personality, the early communism and Rousseau: "This first figure (Baboeuf - EK) of the Communism was just coming out of the Sansculottism. The equality, which Babeuf had in mind, was therefore a Sansculotte equality, an equality of the poverty. Luxury, arts and sciences should be abolished, the cities destroyed ; Rousseau's state of nature was the phantom that haunted at that time the minds. "Moses Hess," socialism and communism ". in : M.H. Selected ritings. Wiesbaden, o.J. (Fourier). P.157.
9 The first German edition is quoted here. Consequently, it is also quoted in the old style of writing. S. Emile or about the Education. Dt. Übers. o.N. Frankfurt and Leipzig, Book I. P.4.
10 There are numerous examples for the fact, that according to Rousseau (and analogously and generally to the Enlightenment) the grounds of every political and ethical system was exclusively possible only on the assumption of the fundamental and infinite human freedom . Kant's ethics delivers an example of this , which liberal starting positions went far go beyond the actual relations of the concrete society. On a similar basis it has to be highlighted, that Rousseau's influence on Hegel, also independent from the problematic of recognition, is a very relevant one, here that dimension shall be highlighted, in which the "formal" dialectic of the thinking could have helped Hegel on his way, through Rousseau's numerous ideas of "the Real dialectic".
11 We do not exclude that what we precisely understood here under "structural revolution ertum ä", is described in Isaiah Berlin as a "revolutionary reorganization of the society" through Rousseau. S. I.B., Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas. Pimlico, 1979. (Hogarth Press). 20.
12 Nietzsche, Friedrich: Collected Works. Critical studies edition in 15 volumes. Published by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. Berlin - New York, 1967-1977. Vol. 11, P.61.
13 Behind Nietzsche’s several critical acts, there is this motive (so for example, behind his criticism of the socialism).
14 The meaning of the philosophical semantics, intended here, cannot be fully executed in this attempt . Its essential definition is that the legitimacy of the philosophical language (of the philosophical discourse) can occur either "from below" according to certain legitimizing criteria or "from above" on the way of a philosophical terminology brought into motion, and in this second case, the philosophy is committed to complete its own legitimacy in the course of its own execution. About this problematic, s. of the author, the following works : About the function of the semantics as common backgroung between phenomenology and Postmodernism. In : Prima Philosophia. Vol 19, Book 1. 2006. 5-21. Also : About the functions of the semantics as common background between phenomenology and Postmodernism. in: Acta Universitatis Palackianae Olomucensis Facultas Philosophica. Philosophica – Aesthetica 29. Philosophica VI. – 2005. Olomouc, 2005. 263-276. und Szemantika és tipológia a filozófiában. in: Pro Philosophia Füzetek, 38. szám, 2004. 103-115. und c3.hu/-prophil/profi042/Kiss.html.
15 Voltaire – Friedrich der Grosse, Briefwechsel. Herausgegeben und übersetzt von Hans Pleschinski. München, o.J. (Hanser). S. 572.