World
Congress of Philosophy
Athen, 2013
Section: Philosophy
of Globalisation
The scientific research, as well as the philosophical theory building, is confronted in global time changes to new theoretical spaces. The new spaces can occur as true tabula rasa.
In these situations, it is not always easy to decide, what the tabula rasa is really composed of. The empty space can be such as the research can sufficiently identify already the new object, but its instruments not being however sufficient – totally or partially – to investigate it. The empty space can however also emerge so, that the research cannot identify for some time the new world of the new object in the mass, that it can no longer decide, if also its original methods and instruments are really still usable. In this second case, the research come into a crisis of its self-conscious identity, which it must then get out of, only at the cost of big efforts.
The new spheres of the knowledge and thus the tabula rasa should remind us precisely in their logical newness , that (1) our methodological apparatus is and was1 also not unilateral, that (2) the tabula rasa and the new object dimensions can also bring to life false trends of the theory building, and (3) that relevant motives and reasons, certain for our current time consciousness, can show off also unconsciously and unnoticed as extreme theoretical motives, and finally (4) that also basic questions, also not taken into consideration in the reflection for long, and on this line experienced as particularly current (such as digitalization, virtuality, or the question about the „uncertainty”, taken in the social-scientific sense), can be also strongly overvalued, facing the tabula rasa, precisely as sensitive gaps.
If we interpret the phenomena of the globalization exclusively as the confirmation of the theory of the evolution, it means, that they are moving in the context of the essentialist theory building. The plain identification of a sphere of phenomena with a type of theory (essentialist, or a theory of middle level of philosophical generalisation) leaves no longer any space to the normal scientific research. There is nothing to explore, what has still to be done, is nothing more than the perpetuated statement of the identity (such or such segment of the globalization is a field, in which the evolution is realizing). The apparently illimitated identification is precisely not revealing comprehensive in its truth, but selective. Where such or such segment of the globalization is identical with the evolution, is (tautologically!) confirmed, where they are however not identical with each other, is remaining perfectly unthematized, as if they would not exist.
In this concrete context, the truth or untruth of a concrete essentialist thesis is not directly of primary importance, but the specific symbiosis and coexistence of the given essentialist theses and of the representational sphere referenced in it. As indicated, the essentialist thesis is no longer applying as a reference, but already as the expression, as a kind of mere doubling of referenced reality. The truth of the essentialist thesis is a tautology („The globalization is evolution”), if (1) the scope of the predication is wide enough or even universal, or if (2) precisely such moments of the globalization become thematical, for which the attribution of „evolution” just suits. Where these conditions are not existing, because (1) the scope of the predication is not wide enough or universal („Globalization is the globalization of the international economy”) or if (2) precisely moments are thematized, for which the attribution of „evolution” precisely does not suit, an essentialist theory is not revealing as „wrong”, but it simply loses its sense.
The essentialist type of the theory makes no difference between the object language of the theory and the meta-language of the object language, i.e. of the theory itself. They are identical. They lose their original difference. Both these languages become identical to each other in a third language. Since in them, the difference between the object language and the meta-language is no longer existing, it is also not possible to define, either for one or for the other level, specific criteria.
The absence of differentiation between object language and meta-language leads however also to other dilemmas of the essentialism once already mentioned. The theoretical activity, working with essentialist theories, on the one side cannot come to any essential new insights (briefly: because of the „tautology”, that is in this construction), on the other side there is an almost even worse consequence of this process.
The essentialist theory acts then directly as obstacle on the way of the effective and legitimate theoretical workup of the world of objects. The pure existence, the simple use of an essentialist theory is thus something, that „blocks” the way to real theory approaches. In the essentialist theory, the theory is identical to the object language as corpus (on the other side, it functions as „real” theory). On the one side, it prevents the further knowledge on the world of the objects, on the other side, it prevents also the occurrence of a real theory. It is a double obstacle par excellence. The essentialist theory „does not thematize” the world of the objects – it is identical with this world.
The identification „globalization = evolution”, as briefly mentioned above, blocks also the way in the other direction (normal science). The thesis can enrich, with always new details, anything that may only happen in the research, in the spirit of the beforehand already established identity. The once already established identity can neither articulate the new achievements in the science (as new object language), nor the new achievements in the theory (as new meta-language). Thus, it does not only play at the same time the role of the Great Theory, but also the role of the valid science in this domain. The thesis of the double obstacle gets its validity from this new orientation as well.
At the example of the Marxism (as widespread world vision and not somewhat as such or such element of Marx’s own philosophical lifework), it can be well demonstrated, that this Marxism had united in itself at the same time the function of all mental and theoretical concepts. This Marxism (as public world vision) was namely simultaneously a summation of the economic and social world of the objects, of the positive science and of the theory (also as the sociologically unsustainable definition of a „scientific” world vision), for Marxism is referring also to the „real reality” without any other mediation).
We have no doubt, that the effectively sudden extinction of the Marxism in certain domains was linked with this fact, even if it cannot indeed explain alone the entire phenomenon. A complex, that is at the same time the summation of the reality, the science and the philosophy (and of course, also of the ideology), cannot reform or transform itself more.
The essentialist theory can also not be extended „downward” to individual concrete sciences. To implement „downward” a science from such a theory, such an attempt can hardly avoid a certain arbitrariness (without mentioning, that such an emerging science should finally confirm and thus repeat, for logical reasons, the theory out of which it is coming). This type can also not be extended in the opposite direction („upward”) to a great theory or to another type of system, because it should so lose its most essential determination of the identification of the meta-language to object language. The type of the essentialist theory could not so far become in fact any normal science, also concepts of the unified science, emerging from the type of the essentialist theory, could also not become normal sciences. This serves to prove, that the essentialist theory is in reality no real problem of the science itself, but rather of the scientific theory building. Another visibly coming danger, rather only in the sociological point of view, of this type of theory building is, that this identity of the science and of the theory (also of the summation of the reality and of the ideology) can be tremendously emphasized so that it can come, again intentionally or not, to a quasi-metaphysical relevance as quasi-legitimacy of the universe.
The amalgamation of the object, of the language, of the method, of the science, of the theory and, need be, even also of the world vision, prepares in the practice the biggest problems in the application, since the exact criteria of the applicability because of the inseparability of these dimensions cannot be even exactly named. The application becomes so always an „identification”, that is concretely just one under the empire of the essentialist theory, the concrete problem field is a sovereign territory of such a preformed theory. In this position, this kind of theory must appear as any anticipated being, that we must look in a concrete object field, thus a methodological Platonism arises – surely unintentionnally -, as if the so established concept scheme would make superfluously the always new analysis of the phenomena, the further categorization and the interpretation2.
This identifying amalgamation of the object language and of the meta-language might however also lead to further paradoxes. Is the last form of such an essentialist theory then the object language? If it is so, then this theory can already be no theory, because it cannot become its own theory. If the last form of this kind of theory is however the meta-language, then this theory can already be no theory, because it might not bring contents on objects and theoretical objects into identity relations to each other (globalization = evolution).
While the essentialist theory is always reproducing, it destroys as well the always reproducing conceptual categorization of the empiricism, it destroys however also the theory building corresponding to the epistemological demands. The Great Theory reduces no complexity, the essentialist theory and the theory building are doing it.
It seems, that the previously outlined phenomenon of the tabula rasa could be included through a new Great Theory. This Great Theory is not yet existing. It seems also impossible, that it can be implemented in a „naive” way. The previous lack of attempts to form Great Theory(ies) means, that our present has so far not experienced any particular historical-philosophical situation.
The insight, that the Marxism (it has to be said now, what we exactly understand under Marxism), as last Great Theory, was and is, under no circumstances, the prototype of any Great Theory, belongs to this context. A theory, essentialistically understood, about the globalization could be organized economically – in this case, it would be a model of the free market economy and of the neo-liberalism and as such, an almost optimal institution. If a theory, essentialistically understood, about globalization was organized socially, then the image of the globalization would be a disastrous image.
The contrast between both conceptions underlines the necessity of a Great Theory about the globalization.
2012 - 2013
Jegyzetek
1 In other words : the methodology perceiving the horizons of the tabula rasa might never say of itself, that the previous methodology has exhausted all its possibilities.
2 Therefore, our impression can be understood, regarding where the reality is illustrating within the essentialist theory, there it is dysfunctional, and where everything is funtional at its place, where there is no reality.